

**AL IQITADAR SCHOOL**  
**UNDER THE COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM**  
**ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ**

**SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT**

**SIGIR PA-08-141**  
**JANUARY 26, 2009**

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# SIGIR

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

January 26, 2009

## Al Iqitadar School

### Summary of Report: PA-08-141

### Why SIGIR Did This Study

SIGIR is charged to conduct assessments of Iraq reconstruction projects funded with amounts appropriated or made available for the reconstruction of Iraq. SIGIR is assessing projects funded under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish this objective, SIGIR determined if the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on September 21, 2008.

### What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commanding Officer, II Marine Expeditionary Force determine the status of the air conditioning units. Specifically, whether the contractor was paid to deliver and install the air conditioning units. Second, identify why the closeout documentation show that an overpayment of \$51,915 was made to the local contractor. Finally, require that detailed design drawings be submitted for future similar contracts.

SIGIR received comments on a draft of this report from the Multi-National Force-Iraq which addressed the issues raised in the report and recommendations made. The planned actions are responsive and should address the issues identified.

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at (703) 428-1100 or [PublicAffairs@sigir.mil](mailto:PublicAffairs@sigir.mil)

### What SIGIR Found

On September 21, 2008, SIGIR performed an on-site assessment of Al Iqitadar Secondary School. The contract cost was \$200,000 and the contract's provisions for payment were on an installment basis (four payment installments of \$50,000), with a final inspection required prior to issuance of the final payment. Contract documentation stated the local contractor was paid \$51,915 more than the original contract.

During the site visit, school was not in session. Therefore, SIGIR could not confirm the school was actually accommodating 300 students; however, the facility appeared to be capable of operating as a fully functioning school.

The overall objective of the project was to rebuild the Al Iqitadar Secondary School, located in the Saqlawiyah neighborhood in Anbar province, Iraq. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract.

During the site visit, SIGIR observed that a majority of the Statement of Work requirements for the refurbishment of the school appeared to be complete except for the issue of air conditioning units. According to the contract's Statement of Work, it clearly stated that the contractor was required to "install air conditioning units". During the site visit, SIGIR observed the absence of any air conditioning units. Also, the project file lacked any documentation showing the air conditioning units were ever installed.

Also, the operation and maintenance plan signed by the Ministry of Education manager and the Falluja Director General of Schools required that at the completion of the project, "the facilities are properly maintained." However, routine maintenance was not being done.

The school is completely dependent upon permanent power from the national grid to operate the lights, ceiling fans, and pumps for the water. Since the power from the national grid is unreliable and susceptible to surges, the need for generator power should be considered in order to provide sufficiently reliable power.

While the site visit identified adequate construction, the lack of reliable permanent power and routine maintenance will ultimately affect the ability of this facility to sustain full capacity operations over the long term.





## **SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION**

January 26, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES CENTRAL  
COMMAND  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-  
IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-  
IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING  
COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN  
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Report on Rebuilding of the Al Iqitadar School in Anbar Province, Iraq  
(SIGIR Report Number PA-08-141)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses the current status of the Al Iqitadar School in Anbar province, Iraq. The assessment was made to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract.

Comments on a draft of this report were received from the Multi-National Force-Iraq which addressed the issues raised in the report and recommendations made. The planned actions are responsive and should address the issues identified. As a result, comments to this final report are not required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Brian Flynn via e-mail at [brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil) or at DSN 318-239-2485. For public affairs queries concerning this report, please contact SIGIR Public Affairs at [publicaffairs@sigir.mil](mailto:publicaffairs@sigir.mil) or at 703-428-1100.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.  
Inspector General

# **Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**

**SIGIR PA-08-141**

**January 26, 2008**

## **Al Iqitadar School Under the Commander's Emergency Response Program Anbar Province, Iraq**

### **Synopsis**

**Introduction.** The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is assessing projects funded under the Commander's Emergency Response Program to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted.

**Project Assessment Objective.** The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, the assessment team determined whether the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on 21 September 2008. SIGIR conducted this limited scope assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised an engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

**Project Objective.** The overall objective of the project was to rebuild the Al Iqitadar Secondary School, located in the Saqlawiyah neighborhood in Anbar province, Iraq, to benefit approximately 300 students.

**Conclusions.** On 28 November 2007, the U.S. Marines Regimental Combat Team-6, using funding from the Commander's Emergency Response Program, awarded a contract to a local contractor for \$200,000. The rebuilding of the Al Iqitadar School project was scheduled for completion within 90 days. The project was turned over to the Iraqi's on 8 March 2008. The contract's provisions for payment were on an installment basis— four installments of \$50,000— with a final inspection required before issuing the final payment. According to Multi-National Corps-Iraq documentation, the project was completed on 8 March 2008 with no delays encountered. On 15 March 2008, Multi-National Corps-Iraq issued a Memorandum for Record, which stated that the local contractor was paid \$251,915 for refurbishing the Al Iqitadar School project. Therefore, according to Multi-National Corps-Iraq documentation, the local contractor received \$51,915 more than the original contract and the four invoices showed should have been paid.

The original intent of the Al Iqitadar School project was to rebuild a school that was "destroyed as a result of enemy mortar fire" leaving the area with no school to educate the local children. During the site visit, SIGIR observed that the work completed appeared to meet the Statement of Work requirements, and the facility appeared to be capable of operating as a fully functioning school. At the time of the site visit, however, school was not in session; therefore, SIGIR could not confirm that the school was actually accommodating 300 students. Although the Statement of Work appeared to be adequately developed and detailed to address the needs of the facility, SIGIR observed that the school depends completely on permanent power from the national grid to operate

the lights, ceiling fans, and pumps for the water. Because the power from the national grid is unreliable and susceptible to surges, the need for generator power should be considered to provide sufficiently reliable power to allow for a more conducive environment for education.

Even though the SOW was well planned, the absence of the requirement for detailed design drawings may result in operation and maintenance problems for the school. For example, electrical and plumbing drawings should have been required; specifically, electrical system one-line diagrams and plumbing plans and details for sanitary sewer systems, which is needed for proper operation and maintenance and future repair and rehabilitation work.

The construction appeared to be adequate and to satisfy the work required by the Statement of Work, except for the issue of air conditioning units. The contract's Statement of Work clearly required the contractor to "install AC units". During the site visit, it did not appear that the air conditioning units were ever installed. The project file lacked any documentation to determine whether the air conditioning units were ever installed at the school.

In addition, the Project Operation and Maintenance Plan— signed by the Ministry of Education manager and Falluja Director General of Schools— required that at the completion of the project, "the facilities are properly maintained." The SIGIR site visit identified that routine maintenance of the facilities was not being done.

Although the site visit identified adequate construction, the lack of reliable permanent power and routine maintenance will ultimately affect the ability of this facility to sustain full capacity operations over the long term.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commanding Officer, II Marine Expeditionary Force:

1. Determine the status of the air conditioning units and whether the contractor was paid to deliver and install the air conditioning units.
2. Determine why the contract amount, status of payments made to the contractor, and the closeout documentation show that an overpayment of \$51,915 was made to the local contractor.

**Management Comments.** The Multi-National Force-Iraq responded that the Iraqi Director General of Education is in the process of verifying the location of the air conditioning units. Once the Director General of Education completes the verification process, he will send a status report to the Multi-National Force-West. Multi-National Force-Iraq also verified financial documents confirming that there was no overpayment. The after action report was simply incorrect in stating the amount as \$251,915. This discrepancy has been corrected.

The draft report included a third recommendation that detailed design drawings be provided for future similar contracts. The Multi-National Force-Iraq stated that as-built drawings are important for determining the amount of operations and maintenance funding needed to sustain this project, but stressed that requiring either design drawings or as-built drawings would drive up overall project costs.

**Evaluation of Management Comments.** Management comments addressed the issues raised in the report. Multi-National Force-Iraq's planned actions are responsive and

should determine the status of the air conditioning units. The appropriate corrective actions will be taken once the status of the air conditioning units is determined.

In view of the response by the Multi-National Force-Iraq requiring either design drawings or as-built drawings will drive up overall project costs, SIGIR believes that this would reduce the number of rehabilitations possible under the Commander's Emergency Response Program and eliminated the third recommendation.

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# **Introduction**

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## **Objective of the Project Assessment**

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is assessing projects funded under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, SIGIR determined whether the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on 21 September 2008.

## **Pre-Site Assessment Background**

### **Contract, Costs and Payments**

The U.S. Marines Regimental Combat Team (RCT)-6, using CERP funding, awarded a contract to a local contractor on 28 November 2007 in the amount of \$200,000.

The contract's provisions for payment were on an installment basis (four payment installments of \$50,000), with a final inspection required prior to issuance of the final payment. In addition, the contractor was paid in Iraqi Dinar at the exchange rate of the day paid, not at the date of the contract signing.

The contract required the contractor to complete the project in 90 days. For each additional day needed to complete the project, the contractor was to be penalized \$2,000. According to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) documentation, the project was completed on 8 March 2008 with no delays encountered.

On 15 March 2008, a Memorandum for Record was issued by MNC-I that stated the local contractor was paid \$251,915 for the refurbishment of the Al Iqitadar School project. Thus, according to MNC-I documentation, the local contractor received \$51,915 more than should have been paid based on the original contract and the four invoices.

### **Project Objective, Pre-Construction Description**

The objective of this project was to rebuild the Al Iqitadar Secondary School, which was, at the time, an unsatisfactory and ineffective environment for educating the area's children. As a result of "enemy mortar fire", the school was in a state of disrepair, leaving the area's children an inadequate location in which to obtain an education. Reportedly over 300 children who had attended this school regularly now had to go to schools outside the area resulting in overcrowding at these other schools. The city mayor and Director General (DG) of Education identified the repair of this school as a high priority for the area.

The school is located in the Saqlawiyah neighborhood in Anbar province, Iraq, (Figure 1 and Site Photo 1). Site Photos 2 and 3, courtesy of MNC-I, document the destruction the school experienced during the fighting.



**Figure 1. Aerial image of the Al Iqitadar School site**



**Site Photo 1. Al Iqitadar School**



**Site Photo 2. Al Iqitadar School destruction**  
(Courtesy MNC-I)



**Site Photo 3. Electric panel destruction**  
(Courtesy MNC-I)

### **Statement of Work**

The Statement of Work (SOW) to repair the school required the following:

- replacement of concrete roofing tiles, damaged/missing building walls, damaged concrete interior flooring, and concrete walkways around the school
- replacement of existing electrical wiring system
- installation of lighting fixtures, electrical switches, ceiling fans, air conditioning (A/C) units, and main circuit board
- repair of bathroom facilities

The SOW's list of items to be replaced and/or repaired appeared to be planned and focused on priority needs. However, this school is solely dependent upon permanent power from the national grid to operate the lights, ceiling fans, and A/C units, and to pump water to the roof for usage and storage. The power from the national grid is unreliable and subject to availability for short periods of time. Consequently, the students will have to endure the extremely hot summer temperatures in a school without reliable electricity to cool the classrooms and provide water for the bathroom facilities.

### **Project Design**

The SOW did not require project designs or specification submittals, and the contractor did not submit any project designs. Considering this project required the replacement of the existing electrical wiring system and repair of bathroom facilities, electrical and plumbing drawings should have been required; specifically, electrical system one-line diagrams and plumbing plans and details for sanitary sewer systems, which are needed for proper operations and maintenance and future repair and rehabilitation work.

Even though the SOW was adequately developed, the absence of detailed design drawings may result in operation and maintenance problems for the school.

## Site Progress During Construction

According to the contract, the Marine Civil Affairs Unit, 510 Detachment 3, Team 4 was responsible for monitoring this project. Throughout the renovation project, the Civil Affairs Unit provided numerous progress photographs. SIGIR reviewed and subsequently relied on selected photographs to document examples of construction performance before the project was determined to be completed in March 2008.

Site Photo 4 documents the building masonry work during rebuilding



Site Photo 4. Masonry work during rebuilding (Courtesy MNC-I)

### Warranties

The contract stated that the contractor would provide a six-month guarantee on all work specified in the contract. In addition, the contractor is required to repair and/or replace any and all problems that the project experiences within the 6-month period.

## Site Assessment

On 21 September 2008, the SIGIR assessment team performed an on-site assessment of the Al Iqitadar School project (Site Photo 5). SIGIR was escorted to the site by the local U.S. Marine unit and accompanied by the school's headmaster. At the time of the site visit, the school year had not started.

### General Observations

During the site assessment, SIGIR observed that the following elements of the SOW requirements were functional and/or completed:

- removal of all debris on building premises
- repair of perimeter wall and gate (Site Photo 6)
- replacement of interior/exterior doors
- replacement of damaged windows





Site Photo 5. Al Iqtidar School on 21 September 2008



Site Photo 6. Perimeter wall

### **Replacement of roof, building walls, and interior flooring**

During the site visit, SIGIR observed the construction of the new classroom buildings. The roof tiles appeared to be in good condition throughout the expanse of the roof. There were drainage holes at the roof's edges, which will allow water to drain from the roof. The exterior and interior walls appeared to be adequately repaired/replaced. The majority of the interior tile and concrete floor work was good; however, there were areas of broken tiles and uneven floors (Site Photo 7).



**Site Photo 7. Uneven floors**

**Replacement of existing wiring system and installation of lighting fixtures, electrical switches, ceiling fans, A/C units, and main circuit board**

SIGIR verified the existence of the replaced wiring system by testing the newly installed switches, lighting fixtures, and ceiling fans (Site Photo 8). While going through the classrooms, SIGIR periodically tested the lights and ceiling fans, which were found to be functioning properly. According to the contract's SOW, the contractor was required to "install AC units." It did not appear that the A/C units or mounts for the A/C units were ever installed.



**Site Photo 8. Switches**

During the site visit, SIGIR did not detect any instances of potentially harmful electrical system tampering. However, some of the light fixtures housed debris from a lack of routine maintenance (Site Photo 9).



**Site Photo 9. Debris on light fixture**

### **Repair of bathroom facilities**

The school's bathroom facilities consisted of an inside bathroom for the teachers and administration staff and an outside bathroom for students. The inside bathroom consisted of eastern style toilets and a sink. There were instances of crude construction techniques used in the inside bathrooms; however, the toilets and sink were functional and operational when tested.

The outside bathroom facility consisted of eastern style toilets and a sink. This facility was more difficult to assess because of a significant amount of dirt throughout. Some of the toilets were clogged with debris from a lack of routine maintenance.

### **Project Operation and Maintenance Plan**

As part of this plan, the Ministry of Education manager and Falluja DG of Schools signed an agreement pledging to provide:

*“enough staff to keep the school running and sufficient amount of personnel to conduct maintenance on the school. The Headmaster will ensure that all required personnel are paid and that the facilities are properly maintained. IF this school deteriorates after the coalition forces renovate it, it will be the Ministry of Education's job to correct the deficiency.”*

There were obvious signs, during the site visit, that the school was not being properly maintained. For example, debris in the schoolrooms (Site Photo 10) and a significant amount of dirt and dust was observed. According to the Headmaster, school was to begin at the conclusion of Ramadan. In order to be ready for the first day of school, a considerable amount of cleaning is required.



**Site Photo 10. Schoolroom debris**

## **Conclusions**

On 28 November 2007, the U.S. Marines Regimental Combat Team-6, using funding from the Commander's Emergency Response Program, awarded a contract to a local contractor for \$200,000. The rebuilding of the Al Iqitadar School project was scheduled for completion within 90 days. The project was turned over to the Iraqi's on 8 March 2008. The contract's provisions for payment were on an installment basis— four installments of \$50,000— with a final inspection required before issuing the final payment. According to Multi-National Corps-Iraq documentation, the project was completed on 8 March 2008 with no delays encountered. On 15 March 2008, Multi-National Corps-Iraq issued a Memorandum for Record, which stated that the local contractor was paid \$251,915 for refurbishing the Al Iqitadar School project. Therefore, according to Multi-National Corps-Iraq documentation, the local contractor received \$51,915 more than the original contract and the four invoices showed should have been paid.

The original intent of the Al Iqitadar School project was to rebuild a school that was “destroyed as a result of enemy mortar fire” leaving the area with no school to educate the local children. During the site visit, SIGIR observed that the work completed appeared to meet the Statement of Work requirements, and the facility appeared to be capable of operating as a fully functioning school. At the time of the site visit, however, school was not in session; therefore, SIGIR could not confirm that the school was actually accommodating 300 students. Although the Statement of Work appeared to be adequately developed and detailed to address the needs of the facility, SIGIR observed that the school depends completely on permanent power from the national grid to operate



the lights, ceiling fans, and pumps for the water. Because the power from the national grid is unreliable and susceptible to surges, the need for generator power should be considered to provide sufficiently reliable power to allow for a more conducive environment for education.

Even though the SOW was well planned, the absence of the requirement for detailed design drawings may result in operation and maintenance problems for the school. For example, electrical and plumbing drawings should have been required; specifically, electrical system one-line diagrams and plumbing plans and details for sanitary sewer systems, which is needed for proper operation and maintenance and future repair and rehabilitation work.

The construction appeared to be adequate and to satisfy the work required by the Statement of Work, except for the issue of air conditioning units. The contract's Statement of Work clearly required the contractor to "install AC units". During the site visit, it did not appear that the air conditioning units were ever installed. The project file lacked any documentation to determine whether the air conditioning units were ever installed at the school.

In addition, the Project Operation and Maintenance Plan— signed by the Ministry of Education manager and Falluja Director General of Schools— required that at the completion of the project, "the facilities are properly maintained." The SIGIR site visit identified that routine maintenance of the facilities was not being done.

Although the site visit identified adequate construction, the lack of reliable permanent power and routine maintenance will ultimately affect the ability of this facility to sustain full capacity operations over the long term.

## **Recommendations**

SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commanding Officer, II Marine Expeditionary Force:

1. Determine the status of the air conditioning units and whether the contractor was paid to deliver and install the air conditioning units.
2. Determine why the contract amount, status of payments made to the contractor, and the closeout documentation show that an overpayment of \$51,915 was made to the local contractor.

## **Management Comments**

The Multi-National Force-Iraq responded that the Iraqi Director General of Education is in the process of verifying the location of the air conditioning units. Once the Director General of Education completes the verification process, he will send a status report to the Multi-National Force-West. Multi-National Force-Iraq also verified financial documents confirming that there was no overpayment. The after action report was simply incorrect in stating the amount as \$251,915. This discrepancy has been corrected.

Our draft report included a third recommendation that detailed design drawings be provided for future similar contracts. The Multi-National Force-Iraq stated that as-built

drawings are important for determining the amount of operations and maintenance funding needed to sustain this project, but stressed that requiring either design drawings or as-built drawings would drive up overall project costs.

## **Evaluation of Management Comments**

Management comments addressed the issues raised in the report. Multi-National Force-Iraq's planned actions are responsive and should determine the status of the air conditioning units. The appropriate corrective actions will be taken once the status of the air conditioning units is determined.

In view of the response by the Multi-National Force-Iraq requiring either design drawings or as built drawings will drive up overall project costs, SIGIR believes that this would reduce the number of rehabilitations possible under the Commander's Emergency Response Program and eliminated the third recommendation.

## Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

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SIGIR performed this project assessment from July through December 2008 in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised an engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

In performing this Project Assessment SIGIR:

- Reviewed contract documentation;
- Reviewed the design packages (Statement of Work) and MNF-I's photographs documenting the construction progress of Al Iqitadar School;
- Conducted an on-site visit on 21 September 2008; and
- Conducted briefings with the Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

**Scope Limitation.** Due to security concerns, SIGIR performed an expedited assessment. The time allotted for the site visit was approximately 45 minutes; therefore, a complete review of all work completed was not possible.

## **Appendix B. Acronyms**

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A/C	Air Conditioning
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
DG	Director General
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps-Iraq
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW	Statement of Work

## **Appendix C. Report Distribution**

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### **Department of State**

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for  
International Development

Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction

Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,  
Bureau of Resource Management

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

Inspector General, Department of State

### **Department of Defense**

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International  
Security Affairs

Inspector General, Department of Defense

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

### **Department of the Army**

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  
Logistics, and Technology

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Auditor General of the Army

### **U.S. Central Command**

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central

## **Other Federal Government Organizations**

Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Comptroller General of the United States  
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury  
Inspector General, Department of Commerce  
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services  
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development  
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
President, U.S. Institute for Peace

## **Congressional Committees**

### **U.S. Senate**

Senate Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

### **U.S. House of Representatives**

House Committee on Appropriations  
House Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

# Appendix D. Management Comments

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## MNF-I RESPONSE TO 20081218-027 (MNF-I CT-3422)

Review of SIGIR Draft Report "Rebuilding of the Al Iqitadar School Under the Commander's Emergency Response Program Anbar, Iraq" (SIGIR Report PA 08-141).

**BACKGROUND:** Project Assessment Objective. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, the assessment team determined whether the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on 21 September 2008. SIGIR conducted this limited scope assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised an engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

**QUESTION:** To collect MNC-I comments on the SIGIR Draft Report. Response must address recommendations on pages 11 and 12 of the draft report. Coordinate your comments with Marine RDT6. This input will be used by SIGIR to help build the Final Report. **ACTIONS - 1.** By 28 December 2008, send reply to SIGIR: Angelina Johnston, Angelina.johnston@iraq.centcom.mil and Brian Flynn at brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil. **2.** By 2 January 2009, send copy of the reply to CCIG.

**MNF-I RESPONSE:** MNF-I responds with the following:

1. Awaiting further information from the DG of Education who is physically verifying location of AC units. From USG paperwork the contractor delivered and installed the AC units per the scope of work. MNF-W will send "status" of AC units once DG of Education makes physical verification.
2. Verification with the financial documents shows there was no overpayment to the contractor. The contract amount that was disbursed and liquidated in the USMC's standard accounting budgeting and reporting system (SABRS) was \$200,000. It was initially committed in SABRS at \$251,915 using the government estimate. However, when the contract was signed it was obligated for \$200,000 since the bid came in less than the original estimate. The after action report (otherwise known as commanders clearance memo) was simply incorrect in stating the amount as \$251,915. This discrepancy has been corrected. If the SIGIR inspection team had notified MNF-W's CERP manager during the audit the issue could have been resolved immediately.
3. Requiring design drawings for schools would increase costs while having little added benefit. Schools in al Anbar are relatively straight forward, easy construction projects so adding additional costs up-front for design drawings would be a waste of taxpayer dollars. Instead of design drawings it would make more sense to have as-built drawings

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so you can determine the amount of operations and maintenance funding/effort needed to sustain the project in the long-term. However, as-built drawings for operations and maintenance of mechanical, electrical and plumbing ("MEP") is not necessary due to the means in which Iraqi construction companies surface mount the electrical and plumbing runs (see figures 8, 14 – 18, 20, 24 for surface mounted electrical wiring runs in what appears to be series and see figures 21 – 23 for surface mounted plumbing pipe runs). The surface mounted electrical and plumbing runs significantly reduces any maintenance costs due to immediately seeing the pipe or wiring.

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## **Appendix E. Project Assessment Team Members**

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

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